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Summary 
The issue 
As an organisation which interacts with many people living on limited incomes, the Brotherhood of 
St Laurence is concerned about their access to appropriate mainstream finance. The law school at 
Griffith University also has a commitment to exploring issues of social justice. This research 
project sought the views of low-income people about credit regulations, focusing on disclosure and 
the safety net provisions in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).  
The project 
The major element of the research involved discussions with 30 low-income Victorians who had 
recently signed a credit contract with a bank, credit cooperative or fringe lender. Individual 
interviews were conducted between December 2007 and February 2008. There were two discussion 
guides. One, for bank and credit cooperative borrowers, focused on the participants’ understanding 
of information disclosed in the contract. The other, for borrowers from fringe lenders, focused on 
participants’ responses to hypothetical unfair contract terms. 
Findings 
Discussions showed that most participants managed their finances fortnightly or weekly, and so 
consider whether something is affordable in the context of their fortnightly or weekly budget. As a 
result, the repayment rate tended to be the most important aspect of the contract.  
 
I’m not quite sure about the interest—but I’m paying $46 a fortnight out of my disability 
pension.  
 
While most participants were clear that they had a responsibility to repay the loan, they were less 
clear on the ramifications of not repaying. 
 
When asked about their rights as a consumer, most were only able to focus on the lenders’ 
expectations. Many confused the concepts of rights and responsibilities. 
 
Participants’ comments generally contradicted the fundamental assumption of the UCCC that 
disclosure of information assists borrowers in making an informed choice about signing a credit 
contract. In reality, they signed contracts that they did not understand or felt were unfair because of 
limited options, powerlessness and their relationship with the lender:  
 
I’ve got a lot of reservations with the loan, and I’ve explored other options, but the pension 
doesn’t count as an income [to banks] so we’re stuck in the mud-hole at the moment.  
 
The language and length were barriers to consumers understanding contracts. Some participants 
admitted to being unable to read the contract.  
 
Because I’m illiterate with certain things, but I battle—if I come to a word what I don’t 
understand I skip it, and I have to keep going to the next one. And half the time I skip half 
the letter because I can’t understand what it’s trying to say.  
 
Most felt overwhelmed by the length of the contract: 
 
They’ve got a hell of a lot of pages here. There’s about maybe 20 pages here, maybe more. 
I’m not sure why they have such a big, thick paper. But I think the [financial institution] 
could make it a little bit more briefer than that for people.  
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Many participants had difficulty differentiating between information they wished was in the 
contract and the actual content. Some felt that they had a good relationship with the lender and 
therefore did not expect them to act upon harsh clauses in a contract. One man spoke of a fringe 
lender in the manner of speaking of a friend. Others based their assessment on impressions from 
friends and family and the absence of any adverse outcomes for them. Many based their 
expectations on past experiences with the lender, rather than the contract. 
 
When asked to comment on a mock unfair contract, most participants said that clauses made them 
feel powerless, afraid and vulnerable. However, in relation to their own contract, they generally felt 
that their options were so limited that they had decided to take the risk and proceed. 
 
Participants were asked whom they would approach to discuss a problem with the lender. They 
were also asked to indicate any legal rights they had in the event of hardship or unjust contract 
terms. None mentioned that a court could vary a contract or re-open a contract on the borrower’s 
application, indicating that many low-income people do not understand their rights. Most suggested 
that they would approach the lender; however many considered that they had limited bargaining 
power compared with the lender. 
 
Overall, the study found that current pre-contractual disclosure documents did not help participants 
to understand many of the important terms of the contract, or to know their rights. This suggests 
that the assumptions about human behaviour in the ‘truth in lending’ model of regulation may not 
be supported in the case of low-income people such as those involved in this study. As a result, 
there are four key recommendations for improving the regulatory model so that it better protects 
vulnerable consumers. 
Recommendations 
• Regulators should reduce their reliance on disclosure as a consumer protection measure.  
• The language and length of contracts should be tailored to meet the needs and capacity of 
consumers. 
• The effectiveness of the safety net provisions (which enable consumers to apply to the court to 
re-open unjust transactions or to apply to their credit provider for relief on hardship grounds) 
should be reviewed. Amendments may be needed such as allowing government consumer 
agencies to act on behalf of consumers.  
• The Australian Government should prohibit unfair terms in consumer contracts and create a 
regulatory unit similar to the UK Unfair Contract Terms Unit, charged with responding to 
consumer complaints and proactively reviewing consumer contracts for compliance with the 
unfair terms la
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1 Introduction 
A low-income woman participating in this research explained the impact of signing a contract 
which she later decided was unfair. The experience of negotiating with the fringe lender had been 
devastating to her confidence and she was ashamed. She felt her ability to function had been shown 
to be so faulty that she felt discouraged from trying to pass a driving test, or returning to work: it all 
felt like ‘too much’ for her. 
 
I feel really stupid. I feel really dumb. It’s put me off, in a lot ways, to the point where I 
won’t even bother going to go and get my licence now, because I don’t want to … So I’ll 
just take it as a sign that I’m not meant to have a car and I’m not meant to drive … My ego 
was pretty crushed. Not long after that I hurt my back and I just gave up on work, even 
though the physio and the doctor said I could go back and do light duties.  
 
The Brotherhood of St Laurence and the Griffith University Law School undertook this research 
out of concern about whether low-income Australians entering into credit contracts, like this 
woman, are adequately protected.  
 
Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, protections are primarily based upon disclosure of 
information and the opportunity to commence court proceedings, for example, in the event of 
hardship or unjust transactions. But are these forms of regulation effective in protecting the most 
vulnerable consumers? Or do some low-income people behave like the woman quoted above and 
sign contracts despite not understanding their rights and responsibilities? This research aimed to 
answer this question by seeking the opinions of a group of vulnerable, low-income consumers.  
 
This section explains the scope of the project and the method used. The balance of the report: 
• explains the legal context and describes demographic information about participants in the 
project (section 2) 
• reports on low-income people’s views of the disclosure regulatory system and safety net 
provisions (sections 3 and 4) 
• discusses findings about the regulatory system and sets out recommendations (section 5) 
Method 
Interviews with low-income people 
The major element of the research involved discussions with thirty low-income people in Victoria. 
People were interviewed individually between December 2007 and February 2008. Participants had 
recently signed a credit contract with a bank (these loans were provided in partnership with the 
Brotherhood), credit cooperative or fringe lender. Those that obtained a loan from a fringe lender 
had been prior customers of an informal, small-scale loan scheme operated by the Brotherhood. 
Contracts that the participants had signed were compliant with regulations. This project sought to 
explore regulations and industry-wide practices, rather than particular products or lenders’ 
contracts. 
 
There were two discussion guides (see Appendix). One focused on the participants’ understanding 
of information disclosed in the contract: it was used with 22 bank and credit cooperative borrowers 
(referred throughout the paper as participants of community loan programs). Participants were 
asked to reflect on the paperwork in general, their rights and responsibilities and the most important 
aspects of the contract. They were also presented with a one-page summary of the contract and 
were asked for their opinions on it.  
 
The other discussion guide focused on participants’ responses to hypothetical unfair contract terms 
and involved borrowers from fringe lenders. Eight participants reflected on the process for 
obtaining credit from a fringe lender and were asked their feelings about a mock contract which 
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included terms that consumer groups consider unfair1 (see for example, Australian Consumers 
Association 2002; Consumers Federation of Australia 2008; Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006). 
They were then asked who they would approach about problems with the lender, in order to elicit 
their understanding of rights under the Consumer Credit Code.  
 
The project followed the Brotherhood of St Laurence research ethics processes. Participants had the 
right to refuse to be involved, they provided written consent and their comments were confidential. 
Payment was provided to participants as a way of valuing their time and expertise. 
 
Several limitations of the research methodology should be noted.  
• The research was qualitative in nature, and like most qualitative studies, the number of 
participants was relatively small. Given the sample size, it is not possible to generalise that the 
views expressed are representative of all low-income consumers. In addition, the results cannot 
be analysed statistically. However, this research method was chosen because it gave the 
opportunity to ‘understand the world as seen by the respondents’ (Patton 1990, p. 24). It 
provided a small number of information rich interviews which are at least indicative of the 
views and experiences of vulnerable low-income borrowers.  
• As noted above, some participants had an existing or previous relationship with the 
Brotherhood. This may have influenced their responses, although loans officers took no part in 
the interviews. To minimise this risk, it was emphasised that the loan would proceed regardless 
of their comments and that there were no right or wrong answers. It was also stressed that their 
comments would be confidential and have no impact on any future loan applications.  
• There was also the risk that participants would overstate their understanding of the credit 
contract to avoid feeling like a failure. This was overcome by extensive piloting of the 
interview guide so that the interview would seem quite informal the participants would feel that 
any opinions would be accepted in a non-judgmental way. 
• The discussion about low-income people’s propensity to sign contracts including unfair terms 
was hypothetical. There is likely to have been a bias towards people saying that they would not 
sign a contract with unfair terms but then behaving differently in a desperate situation. As a 
result, this report emphasises opinions on clauses within the contract, rather than views in 
hindsight about the decision to proceed with the loan. The project also focused on participants’ 
understandings of their rights and inclination to pursue them, for example through seeking 
legal advice or commencing court proceedings. 
• Finally, this research focused on one component of the mandated disclosure in consumer credit 
transactions: the pre-contractual statement required by section 14 UCCC. In many cases, the 
pre-contractual statement is the proposed contract document. The pre-contractual statement 
normally includes the information statement of rights and obligations. This research did not 
examine other forms of disclosure required by the Consumer Credit Code, including statements 
of account, and other notices and warnings.  
Literature review 
In parallel with the qualitative research, there was analysis of Australian and international literature 
on the nature and effectiveness of disclosure regulation as a consumer protection measure. In 
addition, literature on the effectiveness of provisions for relief from unfairness and the safety net 
provisions was reviewed. The key findings are summarised in the background section and in 
relation to opinions of participants.  
                                                     
1 Unfair terms are defined in various pieces of legislation (for example UK Unfair Contract terms Act 1977 
and the Victorian Fair Trading Act 1999, as amended by the Fair Trading (Amendment) Act 2003. In this 
research the phrase is used non-specifically for contract details which might reasonably be considered to 
disadvantage the consumer. 
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2 Background 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) commenced operation on 1 November 1996, and is 
now implemented in all Australian states and territories. The code applies to the provision of credit 
wherever the debtor is an individual (for instance, as opposed to a corporate entity), the credit is 
provided wholly or predominantly for personal, household or domestic purposes, and a charge 
(such as interest or fees) is made for providing the credit (see section 6 UCCC). The Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code seeks to protect consumers in two key ways: disclosure and safety net 
provisions.  
Disclosure 
The code relies on extensive disclosure of terms so that consumers are fully informed when 
entering into credit contracts. The key principle informing the UCCC is ‘truth in lending’ based on 
the principles behind the US Truth-in-Lending Act 1968. The purpose of the US legislation was to 
assist the consumer to compare the various credit terms available and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit (Kofele-Kale 1984, p.117). 
 
Disclosure regulation has been described as a form of regulation that has both ‘command and 
control’ type characteristics, in that it is mandated by government with penalties attached for 
breach, and also characteristics aligning it with market based mechanisms. A breach of disclosure 
requirements (set out in sections 14 and 15 UCCC) can attract a penalty of up to $500,000 (see 
section 105 UCCC). This penalty (which is the highest applicable under the Code) demonstrates 
the centrality given to disclosure as a regulatory tool by the drafters of the UCCC. There is an 
expectation that consumers will be in a position to protect themselves and make appropriate 
choices in the market place. In this regard, a UK-based academic, Cartwright, refers to disclosure 
regulation as a ‘relatively ‘pro-market’ regulatory response because it facilitates the consumer’s 
making of an informed choice.’ (Cartwright 2004, p.62)  
 
It is said to address consumers’ lack of information. 
 
Neo-classical economics assumes that, for markets to provide the most efficient allocation 
of resources, the parties to transactions have ‘perfect information’ about the relevant 
products and their cost. When credit consumers have imperfect information they will not be 
able to make rational choices about products and this will lead to market failure. (O’Shea & 
Finn 2005, p.5)  
 
Much of the literature on disclosure regulation suggests that this form of regulation is likely to be 
of the least benefit to low-income, vulnerable consumers. As long ago as 1976, Day wrote that: 
 
Information disclosure requirements have been aptly described as protection for the middle 
class. Low-income buyers, who have the greatest need for protection or assistance in 
making more informed choices, are more likely to lack the characteristics that will allow 
them to take advantage of the information. (Day 1976, p.49) 
 
One of the characteristics likely to make it difficult for low-income people to take 
advantage of information is a lack of choice. 
 
Information is only useful if it can be acted upon. The poor may rationally decide not to 
make use of information if they feel no alternatives will be available to them. (Howells 
2005, p. 357) 
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Safety net provisions 
Secondly, the code contains a number of provisions referred to in this report as ‘safety net 
provisions’.2 These include the right to seek a change to a credit contract on the grounds of 
hardship (see sections 66 and 68 UCCC) and the rights to pursue credit providers through the 
courts on the grounds that a transaction is unjust (see sections 70 and 71 UCCC), or that certain 
fees or variations in interest rates are unconscionable (see section 72 UCCC). In particular, if a 
transaction is found to be unjust a court may re-open, set aside, revise or alter the terms of the 
credit contract.  
 
There has been much criticism of these safety net provisions. The major concern is that they 
require individual consumers to initiate legal action; it is not possible for a regulator to take action 
on behalf of consumers. Court and tribunal records indicate these provisions have been relatively 
little used by consumers (see for example, Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 2007, p.20).  
 
The difficulties and costs of legal action are likely to be most prohibitive for consumers on low-
incomes. For instance, a UK study demonstrated that low-income consumers are unlikely to take 
legal action in relation to a loan, given the cost, a sense of powerlessness, and a fear of bitter 
disputes (Genn 1999, p.101). A more recent NSW study of responses to legal problems found that, 
among a range of civil, criminal and family problems, credit problems were the least likely to result 
in legal action being taken by disadvantaged consumers (Coumarelos, Wei & Zhou 2006, noting 
however that the sample size for credit matters was only 26). 
 
Such difficulties have been addressed to some extent in the UK by the Office of Fair Trading which 
has an Unfair Contract Terms Unit which acts on complaints received from consumers concerning 
unfair terms. This unit does not pursue claims on behalf of individual consumers. Instead, it acts to 
protect consumers generally by seeking an undertaking from businesses to abandon or amend 
standard terms which it views as unfair. It also has the power to seek a court injunction against 
anyone using an unfair term. 
Demographics of participants 
As table 2.1 shows, compared with the Australian population as a whole, participants in the 
research were much more likely to have limited education, half of them having completed only 
year 10 or below. They were predominantly renters of public housing, receiving income support 
payments and not in the workforce. Almost two-thirds (63 per cent) of them would have been 
defined as ‘financially excluded’ (ANZ 2004), in that their only financial product was a single 
transactional account, prior to taking out the loan under discussion in this research.  
 
                                                     
2 These are characterised as ‘safety net’ provisions in this report because they operate in the event that 
consumers’ circumstances change or that disclosure and competition have not provided adequate consumer 
protection.  
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Table 2.1: Demographics of participants  
Characteristic Percentage of 
participants 
Percentage of 
Australian population 
Gender    
 Male 53 50 
 Female 
 (ABS, p. 113) 
47 50 
Country of birth   
 Australia 67 77 
 Overseas 
 (ABS, p. 135) 
33 23 
Language spoken at home    
 English 83 84 
 Other 
 (ABS, p. 385) 
17 16 
Living arrangements    
 Renting privately 10 21 
 Renting from the government 83 5 
 Owning or purchasing home 0 70 
 Other 
 (ABS, p. 224) 
6 4 
Income and employment   
 Receive income support payments 
 (ABS, p. 201)  
100 24 
 In the workforce  
 (ABS, p. 148)  
8 65 
Highest level of education attained    
 Year 9 or below 37 10 
 Year 10 13 15 
 Year 11 10 7 
 Year 12 27 17 
 Non-school qualification (such as 
degree or certificate) 
 (ABS, p. 313) 
13 51 
Financial exclusion*    
 Own no financial products 0 1 
 Transactional account only 63 6 
 Own more than one financial product 
 (ANZ, p. 8) 
37 93 
(Total number of participants) 30  
* Note: financial exclusion of participants describes their situation prior to the loan under discussion 
 
3 Views of people on low-incomes: disclosure documents  
Interviews were conducted to ascertain the extent to which the low-income participants understood 
the terms of credit contracts, and found the disclosure documents useful. For those that had not 
understood the documents, the interview explored their reasons for still signing the contract and 
barriers to understanding it. 
What they understood 
Responsibilities 
All participants understood that they had a responsibility to repay the loan. This understanding did 
not generally come from the lender’s paperwork, but rather the borrowers’ sense of an unwritten 
contract along the lines of: ‘I promise not to default’: 
I think my main responsibility is to make sure—which I do every fortnight— that the 
money’s in the bank … Every time I get my pension I make sure that I leave that money 
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there for the [financial institution] because it makes me feel good and it makes me feel 
responsible as a person.  
 
Having made the commitment, this participant felt she did not need the paperwork which she later 
admitted was beyond her comprehension anyway.  
 
Borrowers gave the impression that they took their obligation to repay very seriously, and were 
optimistic about their capacity to repay, not contemplating default:  
 
I haven’t even started yet. I don’t think I’ll have any problem with the payments.  
 
This bias towards optimism is consistent with academic research into behavioural economics, a 
new discipline which combines economics and psychology (see for instance, Howells 2005). 
 
Repayment rate and interest 
Most people on low-incomes manage their finances fortnightly or weekly, and so consider whether 
something is affordable in the context of their fortnightly or weekly budget. As a result, the 
repayment rate tends to be the most important aspect of the contract:  
 
I’m not quite sure about the interest—but I’m paying $46 a fortnight out of my disability 
pension.  
 
While participants usually knew how much they were paying in total in interest and fees, very few 
understood how interest worked or what the interest rate meant. For those borrowing from fringe 
lenders, most knew the charges were high when they signed up. They were very clear on the 
tangible impact of these repayments on their budget:  
 
You end up paying about $190-something on a $100 loan. That is a lot of money.  
 
While this participant was clear that she was paying a total of $90 in interest, she later explained 
that she did not understand how this was represented as an interest rate: 
 
I don’t know about interest rates … Because I’ve never had anything to do with interest 
rates and calculating interest and all that. Their interest rate is absolutely shocking.  
 
Academic findings in relation to consumers’ understanding of fortnightly repayment rates, interest 
rates, terms and total interest is variable. Some studies are consistent with participants in this 
research. For instance, a UK study found that low-income borrowers had a strong understanding of 
weekly repayments (Collard & Kempson 1999, p.16) and research in Victoria found little 
comprehension of annual percentage rates and a tendency to understand the cost of the loan in 
dollar terms, rather than interest rates. (Wilson 2002, p.77) 
 
In contrast to many participants in this study, research with low-income consumers in Canada and 
students in Queensland found a low level of understanding of the total cost of the loan (Lott & 
Grant 2002; O’Shea & Finn 2005). A study of 1600 borrowers from diverse income groups, 
conducted by Justin Malbon for the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, also showed that 
borrowers find it easiest to compare loan products in terms of annual percentage interest rates—that 
is, they understand interest rates (Malbon 1999). 
 
Key points 
• Participants generally understood they had the responsibility to repay a loan. 
• They also understood the regular repayment amount, the term and total interest to be paid over 
the loan term.  
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What they didn’t understand 
Ramifications of not repaying the loan 
While most participants were clear that they had a responsibility to repay the loan, they were less 
clear on the ramifications of not repaying. One man explained his lack of clarity and inexperience: 
 
I’d assume they’d take me to court I suppose or institute legal procedures, do the usual 
things. See I’m not really in the field of having loans. It’s the first time I’ve ever taken one, 
I’ve never had to do a loan before.  
 
Many participants believed that the lender had the right to repossess assets, although for 
community loan participants, credit was generally unsecured. One woman felt that the financial 
institution could take a variety of actions and simply accepted this as a fact of life.  
 
If we fall behind, they’ve got the right to come and repossess or take legal action against 
you … They’ve got all the rights to come out and repossess some of your furniture.  
 
Another thought that if a borrower defaulted: 
 
[The financial institution] would make an application for the next of kin or something like 
that, for the default. I don’t know really myself.  
 
By law, a credit provider can only pursue someone for a debt if they have signed a credit contract. 
The credit provider can only pursue a person who is next of kin if that person has signed a 
guarantee for the loan.  
 
Only one man felt the consequences of not paying would be limited. He spoke in terms of a battle 
ground between the borrower and lender. This was representative of his approach to life, rather 
than a response to specific information presented in the contract. 
 
They can be entitled to what they like, but you can’t get blood out of a stone … And I’m 
damned sure that if they took me to court, the court would say the same thing. He’s got to 
live … So you know, that sort of stuff is a nonsense, those sort of threats, as far as I’m 
concerned. They’re unenforceable nonsense.  
 
This participant understood that the expense for a financial institution in taking someone to court 
might exceed the amount owing for a small loan. In this instance, the unpaid debt would most 
likely be listed on the borrower’s credit record, but he was not concerned about that.  
Rights 
When asked about their rights as consumers, most participants were only able to focus on the 
lenders’ expectations. Many confused the concepts of rights and responsibilities. For instance, one 
woman commented that she had the right ‘to do the right thing, to pay them’.  
 
Some people realised they had rights in relation to privacy legislation but seemed unsure of the 
specifics: 
 
Probably privacy, something like that. Privacy. And what else? I don’t know other things.  
 
Some people repeated what was in the contract, without seeming to understand what it meant in 
relation to their rights: 
 
I’ll be honest with you, I haven’t gone right through it as yet ... [The financial institution] is 
bound by the code of practice for providing a service to you.  
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One man had a keen sense of fairness, for him there was an unwritten contract with any company 
of the right to respect, politeness and treatment as a human being rather than as just a number. 
Unlike most other participants, he didn’t have faith that the company was always right, he felt 
powerful as a consumer:  
 
People are like sheep, you know. One jumps over the cliff and they all follow along. I’ve 
never been like that. I’ll pay right to the last cent of what I owe, but if someone just comes 
along and tacks something on, I’ll say, sorry, I won’t fall for it.  
 
Many borrowers from fringe lenders realised that they had grasped at anything offered and as a 
result felt that the lender had more rights:  
 
[I borrowed from a fringe lender] because I gambled it. I’m a gambler and sometimes it 
gets me into a real lot of trouble…. My rights and [the fringe lenders’] rights - it’s all [the 
fringe lenders] rights, nothing to do with my rights.  
 
Many assumed that they would forfeit their rights if they defaulted, but seemed confident that 
would not happen. They did not consider the possibility of a crisis. 
 
I don’t necessarily read the contracts, but I know I’m going to make the payments so I don’t 
worry about the consequences because I’m going to make sure I don’t default … If you 
don’t default you will be protected.  
 
Where the loan is regulated by the UCCC, as noted earlier, if consumers default because of illness, 
unemployment or other reasonable cause, they are entitled to ask the lender for terms to be varied, 
and, if this request is refused, they are entitled to ask the court to vary the terms of the contract. 
 
Overall, low-income participants did not understand their rights or the ramifications of not repaying 
a loan. This suggests consumers are vulnerable to the risk that a lender would behave in an 
unethical way. 
 
Key point 
• Many participants did not understand their rights or the ramifications of not repaying a loan. 
 
Reasons for signing a contract without fully understanding 
Limited options 
The primary reason low-income people signed a contract without fully understanding was that they 
realised their options were limited. Participants were able to see that desperate people would accept 
onerous conditions including poor information or unfair terms: 
 
I felt I was being railroaded, but I was desperate for a car ... I was a single woman, they 
could see the desperation in my eyes as soon as I walked onto that car lot.  
 
Along a similar line, another woman explained that she borrowed from a fringe lender because of a 
gambling addiction. She felt so vulnerable that she would have been willing to sign anything: 
 
It’s only in very, very desperate times that I’ve got to go up there and get the money. Very 
desperate times. When I was gambling a lot I used to go up there and get money. This is 
when I was spending say $100 on pokies or $150 on pokies out of my pension, which I 
couldn’t afford of course. And then I’d think, oh god, I’ve got no money for this and I’ve 
got no money for that, and blah, blah, blah. Then I’d have to go up to [the fringe lender] 
and get - sort of thing.  
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Those that borrowed from fringe lenders felt desperate for the money and realised that their choice 
was constrained by the realities of the market for credit. The contract seemed less relevant to these 
borrowers as there was no other alternative if they disagreed with the terms or conditions: 
 
I’ve got a lot of reservations with the loan, and I’ve explored other options, but the pension 
doesn’t count as an income [to banks] so we’re stuck in the mud-hole at the moment.  
 
Participants’ opinions are consistent with academic literature. For instance, Malbon found that 
while comprehension levels seemed to be similar across income groups, lower income groups were 
more willing to accept loans regardless of their terms, because of a perceived lack of alternatives 
(Malbon 1999; Wilson 2000):  
 
Most low-income participants stated that their main priority when seeking credit is finding 
out the credit providers who were prepared to provide them credit. Many said they were 
unable to get credit from most places ... For some they had no choice but to borrow from a 
lender who they knew charged high interest rates. Thus choice of lender tended to be 
determined by a lack of bargaining power rather than ignorance of what loans were on 
offer. (Malbon 1999) 
Powerlessness  
Another reason for signing a contract without understanding is a sense of powerlessness compared 
with the lender. A customer of a fringe lender explained that she went along with whatever the 
salesman put in front of her. She felt she had no negotiating power:  
 
I didn’t really understand much of it … It was very quick. He just said, ‘Sign’, so I signed 
and that was it. He didn’t explain anything, nothing.  
 
Another woman likened the experience of dealing with a fringe lender to being rushed to sign a 
tenancy agreement. She commented that it was not just the length and complexity of the documents 
but the need to accommodate the other person by hurrying: 
 
[The housing officer] was just nagging me, ‘Just take this paper, this paper, this paper’… 
The fact that you don’t actually get a chance to read it probably only occurs because people 
just don’t give enough time for individual people to read things.  
 
The view of one customer of a community loan program was that the lender held all the power and 
could do anything. He was resigned to his role of just paying: 
 
I’ve signed, I have to take it, I have to cop it, there’s no problem—but what can I do? I just 
have to try and pay it and do whatever’s got to be done.  
 
While most people felt powerless, they tolerated it. However, one woman spoke strongly of 
predatory behaviour by fringe lenders: 
 
Why offer somebody a loan if you’re going to strangle them with it? That’s not going to 
save them. If they want the loan they need the money … And they do that to poor people. If 
you really need the money you will sign it because you need that money then. And you’ll 
have to pay all that money back …You don’t say it’s not robbery? Isn’t that crook? That’s 
Ned Kelly without a gun, in my opinion. It’s about poor people, it is.  
 
Despite understanding that they are signing contracts which contain unfair clauses or realising that 
they are paying high interest rates, many low-income people still make the choice to proceed. This 
is because other factors are more important to them than the charges and the clauses in the contract. 
These factors include access to credit and a service where they are treated with respect.  
 
This finding contrasts with a central aspect of Western contract law known as ‘freedom of 
contract’, which means that individuals have the right to make their own bargains on their own 
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terms. The framework assumes that the contracting parties are both capable of protecting their own 
interests. However as low-income participants have suggested, this ignores the realities of standard 
contracts and the unequal bargaining positions of most consumers (for example, see the discussion 
in Gazal-Ayal 2007). 
 
Key point 
• Participants often signed a contract without understanding because they felt a sense of 
powerlessness and also realised their options were limited. 
 
Barriers to understanding  
The language  
Many participants spoke of their limited education, which made it difficult for them to understand 
contracts. As one participant explained, the wording in contracts needs to be simplified:  
 
What they need to do is they need to go over the contract again and maybe word it better 
for people who are not [educated]— see I’ve only done Year 10, and I think that’s my 
failing, where I’ve gone and signed the contract and I couldn’t understand a lot of what was 
being said. It blurred: I see all these words ... I think they need to go back and reword it and 
maybe put it in more plainer English.  
 
This woman later reflected that she would not have accepted a contract from a fringe lender if she 
had the capacity to understand it: 
 
If I had been a little bit more contract-savvy, I would have been onto it … If I knew what I 
was reading. If it was in layman’s terms, like really basic.  
 
Some participants admitted to being unable to read the contract:  
 
Because I’m illiterate with certain things, but I battle - if I come to word what I don’t 
understand I skip it and I have to keep going to the next one. And half the time I skip half 
the letter because I can’t understand what it’s trying to say.  
 
These comments demonstrate that legalistic, lengthy documents can be so ‘user unfriendly’ that the 
borrower cannot understand the terms of the contract that they are signing. Another participant 
explained that she could read the words but not comprehend the complicated legal concepts:  
 
I could read but… I can’t understand the meaning of the form.  
 
She later explained that she is dependent on friends and family to assist her in completing all types 
of paperwork. A friend had read the contract to her. The borrower had not understood it herself, but 
having it read and the other person understanding it helped her to feel that it must be acceptable. 
She had followed the financial institution’s instructions to read the document but had not really 
comprehended it: 
 
I said to her, ‘I know it’s a lot to read, but I want you to read it to me just to make sure that 
everything’s all right’… They state that you’ve got to read that document clearly to make 
sure everything is up to date and everything is all right for your piece of mind, and also for 
theirs as well.  
 
Most participants had not finished school. They had a limited understanding of the language used 
in contracts. Many words used were not in their common vocabulary. Some were apologetic for 
their ignorance, rather than complaining about the complex language:  
 
What does that mean, ‘impose and …’? Well it says ‘impose and …’: Oh, I’m sorry.  
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Another participant felt that she was ‘street-wise’ and understood the concept of repaying the loan, 
her repayments and the dynamic between herself and the lender. However, she found the language 
in the contract difficult to understand: 
 
I think it’s the wording of it, the way it’s worded. Like I only went to Year 9 at school— 
I like to think I’m a little bit educated, but that wasn’t from school … It’s sort of like 
mumbo-jumbo a lot of it … I understand there’s got to be laws and that, but I think they 
should be so everybody can understand them. It should start from there and go up, not start 
from the top and go down.  
 
One woman who had come to Australia as a refugee advised that she had finished school when she 
was six years old. When asked about the most important part of the contract to her she pointed at a 
heading for a relatively unimportant section which stated ‘processing of repayments, additional 
payments, or other transactions’. Her response demonstrated that people without strong English 
skills or education have no realistic prospect of understanding complex legal documents.  
 
Length 
Most participants felt overwhelmed by the length of the contract: 
 
They’ve got a hell of a lot of pages here. There’s about maybe 20 pages here, maybe more. 
I’m not sure why they have such a big, thick paper. But I think the [financial institution] 
could make it a little bit more briefer than that for people.  
 
The length meant that people focused only on a few basics and either trusted the remainder of the 
contract, or felt unable to do any more than pay the required amount: 
 
I just skipped it and got straight down to the point and looked at what your loan payment, 
what your interest was, how long it was over, and what was the actual finalising of the loan, 
what was the actual date that I got signed up for it. 
 
Another woman emphasised that a shorter document would have been easier for her to understand. 
While she was illiterate, she understood that the contract was not written simply to benefit her: 
 
They should keep it just basic and one or two pages with simple words on it than something 
really complicated that you can’t read … Why send out a contract for you to sign and end 
up having pages and pages of it to deal with? I think more it’s to cover their backside really 
… But it’s your risk.  
 
In contrast, another woman believed that a long contract would include every possibility, whereas a 
short contract might be a financial institution’s way of tricking the borrower. She assumed that the 
lender would act entirely for their interests and take any chance to exploit her:  
 
If something’s in a short form, I don’t think you know enough about it. I would rather read 
through 30 pages of the contract than one page which doesn’t tell you anything much at all. 
And I can assure you I read every page of the contract.  
 
While this woman was willing to place more trust in a longer document than a shorter one and to 
read it through, in reality, she was unable to fully understand it. She thought the lender had the 
right to repossess assets, although her loan was unsecured. 
 
It was not surprising that some participants felt contracts were long. In effect, legislated disclosure 
requirements result in long contracts (see the disclosure requirements set out in clauses 14 and 15 
of the UCCC). In addition, the role of lawyers in financial institutions is to protect the commercial 
interests of that institution rather than to write a contract which is accessible for consumers. 
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Academic literature also cites problems with the length of contracts. For instance, Howells suggests 
that many consumers do not take the time to be informed. He finds that consumers have a limited 
ability to understand and process information: 
 
The human mind handles data by breaking it down into manageable chunks. It has been 
estimated that roughly seven chunks of information is the most the human mind can handle 
at any one time. (Howells 2005, p 360) 
 
This is supported by Malbon (1999):  
 
Whilst some participants carefully read the information provided to them, a number found 
it difficult to use … Several participants made the point that they had to rely on the bank 
manager or service officer to explain the loan terms, and that they had to accept their 
explanation on trust. (p. 71) 
 
Problems for low-income people in understanding the contract are consistent with Howells’ study, 
suggesting that disclosure (that is, spelling out the details in writing) is a ‘middle class tool’: 
 
Those who take advantage of information are likely to be the more affluent, well-educated 
middle-class consumers. Evidence from studies of consumer credit disclosure rules 
suggests that it is better-off consumers who tend to make use of information. (Howells 
2005, p. 357)  
 
As a result, there is an argument that reliance on disclosure regulation can actually exacerbate 
social inequities. Wilhelmsson (1997) states that:  
 
Information measures are neutral as to their recipients, which in practice means an 
advantage for the consumers who are well-equipped to use the information. In this sense, 
therefore, measures based on the information paradigm may reproduce and even  strengthen 
existing social injustice. (p.224) 
 
The effectiveness of information disclosure strategies depends upon general and financial literacy 
in the community. Australian research shows a strong link between financial literacy and socio-
economic status, with the lowest levels of financial literacy being associated with consumers with 
lower levels of education and incomes (ANZ 2005). However, it is not just low-income people who 
struggle with disclosure documents. The Deputy Chairman of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission has noted that ‘46 per cent of Australians can’t read well enough to 
understand financial disclosure documents’ (Cooper 2008, p.2). 
Prejudices 
Many participants had difficulty differentiating between information they wished was in the 
contract and the actual content. Some felt that they had a good relationship with the lender and 
therefore did not expect them to act upon harsh clauses in a contract. One man spoke of a fringe 
lender in the manner of speaking of a friend, and expected that the lender would act in his best 
interests: 
 
But if you do really have a very good connection with the lender, he will do as many things 
for you.  
 
Others had based their assessment on word of mouth and the absence of any adverse outcomes for 
friends. For a borrower from a community loan scheme, the reputation of the lender had a stronger 
impact on the decision making process than clauses in the contract: 
 
Other people I know that have had loans from there never complained … They said they’re 
pretty fair and pretty good, so I said ‘OK, I’ll take your word for it’.  
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Many based their expectations of the contractual agreement on past experiences with the lender, 
rather than the contract. A customer of a fringe lender read out a phrase from the hypothetical 
contract and commented: 
 
‘Impose and debit to the Loan Account any new fee or charge’: I’ve never noticed them 
change their fees or charges … I think it’d be their obligation to say to you that they’ve 
changed it. That’s what I think anyway. ‘Change the frequency of your repayment’, now 
they don’t do that, I know that.  
Information overload 
Many participants could only focus on a limited amount of detail. For instance, one woman was 
struggling to manage with many personal problems. This meant she understood a few basics related 
to a financial transaction, but then dismissed any other information. For her, the contract became 
pages of information and questions that she could not understand.  
 
Behavioural economics research supports this view, in the sense that too much information can 
simply cause people to ‘switch off’: 
 
Overwhelmed by too much information, normal consumer reaction is to ignore the 
disclosures entirely. (Kofele-Kale 1984, p.128)  
 
Lauren Willis refers to ‘information overload’ and writes that: 
 
Consumers today are drowning in financial choices and detailed information about every one of 
them. Too many choices and too much information may be as harmful as too few and too little. 
(Willis 2008, p. 16) 
 
The findings of this research are also consistent with theories of behavioural economics more 
generally, which suggest that many people are overly optimistic, may rationally overlook contract 
terms because of a lack of choice, and cannot process a large volume of information and therefore 
only consider salient terms (see generally Howells 2005). 
 
Key points 
• Participants’ comments generally contradict the fundamental assumption of the UCCC that 
disclosure ensures borrowers can make an informed choice about signing a credit contract. In 
reality, the participants signed contracts that they did not understand or felt were unfair because 
of limited options and powerlessness.  
• The language and length of contracts were barriers to consumers understanding them. 
• Behavioural biases also acted as a barrier to understanding the contract. These were based on 
an expectation that the lender would act in their best interests and a reliance on anecdotal 
information and past experiences. 
 
4 Views of people on low incomes: legal rights 
The interview process sought to ascertain whether there were clauses in the contract which the 
participants regarded as unfair and their responses to those clauses. Participants were asked about 
their willingness to enter into the contracts, and their understanding of legal rights in the event of 
signing an unfair contract. 
 
By law, a court may ‘reopen’ an unjust transaction under section 70 of the UCCC. In determining 
whether a transaction is unjust, the court can consider factors such as the relative bargaining power 
of the borrower and lender and whether the contract imposes any conditions that are unreasonably 
difficult to comply with, or not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of a party to 
the contract. In addition to rights under the UCCC, consumers may also have rights under the 
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common law and legislation to challenge a contract as unconscionable3; or in New South Wales, to 
challenge a contract on the grounds that it is unjust.4 
 
No Australian jurisdiction currently gives consumers the right to challenge a term in a credit 
contract on the grounds that the term is unfair. However, the Victorian Government has indicated 
an intention to apply its unfair terms legislation to consumer credit contracts (Consumer Affairs 
Victoria 2008) In addition, the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (2008) has recently 
proposed that a new national consumer law include a provision to deal with unfair contract terms, 
applying to all consumer contracts. 
 
The Australian position contrasts with the situation in the European Union, where member 
countries give consumers legal rights to challenge unfair terms in consumer contracts (including 
credit contracts).  
Opinions on clauses that accelerate the obligation to repay  
Research participants were presented with a one-page summary of the contract (for bank and credit 
cooperative borrowers) or a mock unfair contract (fringe lending borrowers). Both documents 
included an ‘acceleration’ clause: ‘If you fail to make a payment when it falls due, the lender will 
give you 30 days to pay and will then be entitled to demand repayment of the full loan amount’. 
While this is a standard term of credit contracts, it does not make clear borrowers’ rights under 
section 84 UCCC to be served with a notice of default, with a certain period to remedy the default 
before the acceleration clause can operate.  
 
Most participants reflected that the clause made them feel powerless, afraid and vulnerable. A 
customer of a fringe lender was aware that she had given the lender this right but felt so desperate 
to obtain the money that she had signed anyway: 
 
I remember them saying that if I don’t pay, if you miss one payment, well they can demand 
that you pay the whole lot out… [I would have felt] terrified. Petrified that I’m going to get 
a letter or a phone call saying, ‘Excuse me, but you defaulted on the loan and we want the 
money straight away.’  
 
A minority of participants felt the acceleration clause was reasonable because they were so 
committed to repaying and confident they would not end up in a position of default: 
 
I think that’s fair, I think that’s very fair . The [financial institution] gives you [the loan] 
because they expect people to do the right thing and give them back their money. Because 
if you remember, [it’s] the [financial institution’s] money, it’s not mine.  
 
Borrowers from a community loans program were shown summarised contracts which included the 
acceleration term. Some of these participants denied that they had signed contracts with these 
clauses. This was possibly because of biases (discussed earlier) and because the clauses were 
embedded within a long document. However in the shorter document, the clauses seemed more 
prominent, and the participants expressed alarm: 
 
‘If you fail to make a payment’—Oh my god! This is not a contract, this is signing your life 
over … No thank you! … What happens if something happens, a kid dies, or something 
happens, and you’re in hospital and something happens and the payment hasn’t gone in - 
OK, you make a double payment next week or next fortnight or something. This is like 
Adolf Hitler! Entitled to demand repayment of the full loan! That’s a bit harsh! … I would 
not take on a contract if I read something like that … The person who reads this, he’ll say 
                                                     
3 For example, sections 12CA and 12CB, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 
(Cwlth). 
4 Section 7, Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). 
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you’re insane if you put your name on that. You put a signature on something like that, 
you’ve just signed your life away.  
 
In fact, the same participant had signed a contract containing this clause and had earlier commented 
that the contract was just a necessary but tedious part of the process and cost of obtaining a loan: 
 
The paperwork’s got to be done. It’s the most boring part, but everything was done very 
quickly, didn’t take much time ... half an hour to spend time to talk to someone and do 
some paperwork for three grand; it was awesome.  
 
One woman very carefully read the contract and understood it. To her, the contract was sufficiently 
threatening and ‘off-putting’ for her to decide not to proceed with the loan: 
 
I don’t want to be locked into something that could change at somebody else’s whim, and 
being on a pension and getting paid fortnightly, 30 days is only two pays to me, so it’s only 
two pays’ notice. I just don’t like the idea of somebody being in that much control. I like to 
be in control myself.  
 
Many other participants did not like the terms in the contract, but felt that their options were so 
limited that they made the decision to take the risk and proceed.  
Opinions on the lender’s power to vary the terms of the contract  
It is standard for the credit provider to have the power to vary the terms of the contract. The 
summary contract included the term: ‘The terms of this loan may be varied by the lender without 
your consent.’ This is subject to the rights of borrowers under sections 59, 60 and 63 of the UCCC 
to receive notice before some types of changes are made. Interviewees were unaware of the power 
of variation in their credit contract, and were certainly unaware of any rights to be given notice of 
the change.  
 
Most participants commented on the power imbalance inherent in the lender’s ability to make 
changes without their consent:  
 
How can you make a contract … making it legal to change anything we like within the 
contract? Is that a contract? That’s double-dutch. The reason for a contract is so it can’t be 
changed … That’s like fingers behind your back and crossing them, telling lies. It’s crazy 
… Well why can’t I change it then? Why doesn’t it say either party, for instance? That 
would be fair; I’m all right with that.  
 
Although increased repayments would have been difficult to manage, another woman had resigned 
herself to being powerless. She had borrowed from a fringe lender because she had limited options. 
She accepted this as her lot in life: 
 
That would be a problem. During a loan in particular—like if you’re actually paying it off 
at the time and all of a sudden it went bang, up a bit higher from what it was the previous 
week for example: it’d be a shock wouldn’t it? … I suppose you have less options, it’s less 
options obviously because your income is low … I suppose I do know that with these kinds 
of loans, because they are easy, you probably are going to have stuff like this in your 
contract.  
 
Low-income people generally want certainty with the repayment amount. They want to feel 
confident that repaying a loan is achievable for them. A community loan borrower was surprised to 
find out that he was giving the lender the right to vary repayments:  
 
That means every year it could change. Your payments could go up. It could make things a 
little bit difficult for me, depending on how up they go. When you’re used to paying $48 or 
whatever and then all of sudden without knowing $58 is taken out, that’s an extra $10 … 
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For someone on a disability pension $10 is six litres of milk for my kids … That little extra 
$10 that a bank might say they’re going to put it on top, it’s just shattered me.  
 
Open-ended clauses about variation can cause people to panic. This man was paying a fixed rate of 
13.7 per cent and an increase in repayments from $48 to $58 per fortnight would have meant a 
doubling of the interest rate.  
 
Only one man (another community loan borrower) felt confident to challenge the lender. Across all 
aspects of his life, this man was determined that no-one would ‘get the better’ of him. This was an 
attitude, not a capacity which could easily develop through consumer protections: 
 
Well they’d have to consult me first and say they want to alter the contract … if some 
unusual circumstances cropped up and they said they were going to have to change this—
something reasonable—I’d just say fair enough. But if they put something outrageous out 
I’d say forget it, I just wouldn’t pay it, you know … I mean the whole thing is a nonsense 
so I wouldn’t even lose a wink of sleep over it. They’ve lost the plot, and it’s their problem, 
not mine. I really would, I’d just say, ‘I’m sorry, you’ve lost the plot, I can’t help you. 
You’re going to have to see someone more professionally skilled than me’.  
 
As previously mentioned, one woman decided not to proceed with the loan because she did not 
agree with many clauses in the contract: 
 
Because I’m on a set income, which is not very much, if anything did change within a two 
year contract I’d be lost, I’d have nowhere to go. I don’t mean homeless or anything. 
I just mean I’d be stuck, I’d be in dire straits because of not having enough money as it is 
now, let alone anything happening.  
 
This indicates that contracts can be very alarming for the consumers who try to understand their 
rights and responsibilities.  
Understanding of rights in the event of hardship 
In addition to being asked about their rights as consumers, participants were asked whom they 
would approach to discuss a payment problem.  
 
Some suggested they would approach legal aid or local community legal centres:  
 
I guess I’d have to call Legal Aid … And then if there was no other hope I guess I’d just 
have to try and pay it.  
 
Others suggested friends or family members. This suggests there is the risk of inaccurate advice if 
people rely too heavily on family and friends.  
 
Participants were also asked to reflect on any legal rights they might have in the event of hardship. 
No-one mentioned that a court could vary a contract, or re-open a contract on the borrower’s 
application, suggesting that many low-income people do not understand their rights. Most 
suggested that they would approach the lender, however many considered that they had limited 
bargaining power: 
 
You go to a solicitor, the solicitor will fight for you. But you are not definitely going to win.  
 
Most intuitively felt that speaking to the lender was the right approach: 
 
I guess it would be the manager there, but I guess if they’ve got this kind of set up then you’re 
really not supported anyway, are you, they just do whatever they want. So I don’t know.  
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Overall, people’s limited networks for advice on legal contracts made it difficult for them to 
understand their rights.  
 
Key points 
• Participants generally did not understand their rights in the event of hardship.  
• Many participants had not understood that the contract they signed gave the lender the right to 
accelerate the obligation to repay or vary terms. Once they were told about the lender’s rights 
they generally felt more powerless and vulnerable. 
 
5 Conclusion and recommendations 
As previously discussed, consumer credit law in Australia is largely based on a ‘truth-in-lending’ 
model. Lenders have to disclose contract terms, to inform consumers and enable them to shop 
around, compare products and select the most appropriate product. In this way, disclosure is 
supposed to encourage competition among credit providers. It is fundamental to this model that 
consumers behave in an economically rational way, with their own financial self-interest at heart. 
There is also an expectation that disclosure will ensure that consumers understand their rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
However, psychology and behavioural economic theory suggest that emotional and other 
imperatives often take over from economically rational behaviour. People are not driven solely by 
rationality, but are also influenced by a range of emotional forces, biases and choices that fall 
outside of their conscious awareness. (See for example the discussion in Howells 2005 and Willis 
2008) 
 
This project also suggests that emotions are often more important than the economics of the 
transaction or the notion of an economically rational decision. These emotions included desperation 
for the money and the humiliation of admitting an inability to understand. For some; the contract 
was secondary to the emotional work of admitting they wanted something from another party. 
There was also the pragmatic realisation that for a person on a low-income, options in the market 
for credit were limited and therefore it was pointless to try to understand the contract. They realised 
that the choice to go elsewhere or negotiate did not exist for them. They simply needed to take 
what they could get.  
 
Borrowers’ capabilities were also important. Many admitted to just not having the literacy levels, 
experience in financial markets or access to advice to be able to understand the contract. As a 
result, they chose to take the risk and proceed with the hope that the lender would have their best 
interests at heart. In this connection, the Productivity Commission has recommended that 
disclosure be ‘layered’ and that initially only key information, necessary to assist the consumer in 
making a decision as to whether or not to proceed, should be provided at the pre-contractual 
disclosure stage with additional information available by right on request. It has also suggested that 
documents should be tested with consumers (Productivity Commission 2007).  
 
Overall, the study found that current pre-contractual disclosure documents (primarily the proposed 
contract) did not help participants to understand many of the important terms of the contract, or to 
know their rights. Instead, emotions and prejudices had a greater influence on their understanding 
of the contract terms, and their rights and responsibilities. These findings of this project may also 
be relevant to a range of other financial services, such as insurance. 
 
This suggests that the assumptions about human behaviour in the truth in lending model of 
regulation are not consistent with psychological research, or the responses of a group of low-
income people detailed in this study. As a result, there are four key recommendations for 
improving the regulatory model so that it better protects vulnerable consumers. 
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Recommendation 1: The language and length of contracts should be tailored to meet the 
needs and capacity of consumers. 
 
Participants demonstrated that the language and length of documents were also barriers to 
understanding contracts. In this sense, the disclosure regulatory regime discriminates against less 
uneducated and more vulnerable consumers.  
 
As a result, it is recommended that state and territory fair trading agencies revise disclosure 
requirements so that lenders must provide a summary contract in plain English. This would include 
details of repayment amounts, term, interest and fees. It would also highlight key terms, 
particularly those that consumers identified as unfair. The summary document should include a 
simple explanation of consumers’ rights under the UCCC, for example their rights to approach the 
credit provider to vary the loan in the event of hardship or to apply to court to have contracts re-
opened in the case of unjust transactions.  
 
State and territory fair trading agencies should also test documents on consumers, including people 
on low-incomes. This would help to ensure that consumers are able to understand rights and 
responsibilities in signing a contract.  
 
Recommendation 2: Regulators should reduce their reliance on disclosure as a consumer 
protection measure.  
 
Participants’ comments generally contradicted the fundamental assumption of the UCCC that 
disclosure enables borrowers to make an informed choice about signing a credit contract. These 
participants suggest that disclosure alone is not adequate to protect vulnerable consumers.  
 
Recommendation 3: The effectiveness of the safety net provisions (which enable consumers to 
apply to the court to re-open unjust transactions or to apply to their credit provider for relief 
on hardship grounds) should be reviewed. Amendments may be needed such as allowing 
government consumer agencies to act on behalf of consumers. 
 
Low-income participants demonstrated difficulty in understanding their rights. They were unsure 
who to approach to obtain advice. Many were unable to advocate for themselves. There is limited 
value to consumer rights and safety net protections if they are not used. 
 
Since the government has a broad responsibility to protect its citizens, it is appropriate for 
government consumer agencies to be empowered to take action on behalf of consumers when they 
are in hardship and to ensure they are not exploited by unfair contract terms. As a result, all state 
and territory agencies should amend consumer credit codes and related legislation to provide that 
government consumer agencies can take action under Sections 68, 70 and 72 of the UCCC on 
behalf of an individual consumer or a group of affected consumers. It is understood that the 
Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (2008) has agreed to amend the UCCC to give 
government consumer agencies standing to conduct proceedings on behalf of consumers. This 
amendment should be introduced as soon as possible. 
 
This could be supplemented by additional funding for consumer legal agencies and community 
organisations to pursue litigation on behalf of vulnerable, low-income consumers. 
 
Recommendation 4: The Australian Government should prohibit unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, and create a regulatory unit similar to the UK Unfair Contract Terms Unit, 
charged with responding to consumer complaints and proactively reviewing consumer 
contracts for compliance with the unfair terms law. 
 
As discussed, many participants had not understood that the contract they signed gave the lender 
the right to vary terms and to accelerate the obligation to repay. Once they understood these rights 
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they generally felt powerless and vulnerable. This sense of powerlessness contradicts the basic 
expectation in Western contract law that each party will have equal bargaining rights.  
 
It has been argued that competition between providers will reduce the incidence of unfair terms. 
However, participants of this project showed that their options were too limited to shop around for 
contracts with more appropriate terms. They also did not have the capacity to understand terms 
when they were embedded in a lengthy document.  
 
This study supports the view that market mechanisms will not operate to reduce the incidence of 
unfair terms in consumer contracts, and that individual consumers are unlikely to take action to 
challenge unfair terms. In these circumstances, new legislation is needed, and must be supported by 
adequate resources. In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) plays an important 
proactive role in administering the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA): 
 
The work of the OFT’s Unfair Contract Terms Unit has had a major impact on the market. 
The OFT has secured the removal of many unfair terms which were almost certainly 
invalid under UCTA; and this shows that allowing parties to challenge terms in their 
individual contracts, while invaluable to them, has a limited impact on contracting practices 
generally. (Law Commission, quoted in Ramsay 2007, p. 211) 
 
Accordingly, the Australian Government should implement legislation that prohibits unfair terms in 
consumer contracts and that imposes a duty on the directors of fair trading departments to act on 
consumer complaints in relation to such terms.5 In this connection, at its most recent meeting, the 
Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (2008) proposed that a new national consumer law should 
incorporate a provision that addresses unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
 
To enable Australians to make effective and appropriate use of credit facilities to enhance their 
daily lives, it is essential that measures to protect vulnerable and low-income groups are 
strengthened. 
                                                     
5 Victoria has already introduced such legislation, but it does not currently apply to consumer credit 
contracts. Other state and territory fair trading agencies have also been considering whether unfair contract 
terms legislation should be introduced in their states. 
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6 Appendix: discussion guides and mock contracts 
Discussion guide: unfair contract terms 
 
1. What did you think of the papers and the way [company name] does things? 
 
2. What did you like about the way they do things? 
 
3. Was there anything you didn’t like? [prompt: In the paperwork or in the process] Was there 
anything you found difficult to understand? [If yes, prompt: Did you do or say anything about 
this?] 
 
Here is a ‘pretend’ contract. It includes some sentences which might be similar to the one you 
signed with [insert name of company they obtained finance from.] We’re interested in what you 
think about this pretend contract and if you can remember, how you felt when you signed up with 
[company name]. 
 
4. Let’s have a look at number 1 on this contract. It’s likely that you had a similar clause in your 
contract with [company name]. What do you think of this? [Prompts: How would you have felt if 
[company name] changed the repayment rate without your okay? How would you feel if they 
changed the interest rate? Did you realise they could do that?] 
 
5. Let’s think about number 2 on the contract. What are your views on this? [Prompts: If [company 
name] asked you to repay the entire loan in one lump sum, how would you have felt? Did you 
realise they could do that?]  
 
6. Let’s have a look at number 3 on the contract. What do you think of this? [Prompts: How would 
you have felt if [company name] were able to take household goods like your bed or kitchen 
utensils if you didn’t repay the loan? Did you realise they could do that?] 
 
7. Did you have any disagreement about the loan with [company name]? [If so] Tell me a bit about 
what happened [Try to get who they spoke to, and why]. [If not] Who would you discuss any 
difficulties with? [Try to get information on why they would go to this person.] Do you think you 
have any legal rights in working out any disagreements about the loan? Can you tell me a bit about 
what these rights might be? 
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Mock unfair credit contract  
 
Credit Contract 
 
Between: Credit provider (“we”) 
And: Borrower (“you”) 
 
1.  From time to time we may: 
a.  change the amount of or basis for calculating any fee or charge, change the interest or fee 
charging cycle, or both, and, except during any fixed interest rate period of the Loan, change 
any interest rate margin, any link to a reference interest rate and the basis for calculating 
interest; 
b. impose and debit to the Loan Account any new fee or charge; 
c.  change the frequency of repayments; 
d.  change the Loan Account number; 
e.  change the way we describe any reference interest rate; and 
f.  change any other terms and conditions. 
 
2.  In the event of default we may terminate this agreement, require payment of all monies then 
due and owing under this agreement, and exercise our rights over security property provided by 
you in accordance with clause 13. 
 
3.  As continuing security for the payment of all of your debts, liabilities and obligations to us, you 
grant a security interest to and in favour of us over all of your present or after acquired personal 
property and proceeds therefrom.  
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Discussion guide: views on disclosure 
 
1.  How did you go with the paperwork? What did you think of it? Was it much different to other 
forms you’ve completed? 
 
2.  Are you interested in what your fortnightly repayment is? (If they don’t give the specific 
repayment rate, prompt: What do you think the repayment rate is?) 
 
3.  What do you think about the length of time it will take you to repay the loan? (If they are not 
specific about the term, prompt: How long do you think it will take?) 
 
4.  What do you think about the cost of the loan? (If they don’t mention interest, prompt: What do 
you think about the interest rate? If they are not specific, ask: What do you think the interest 
rate is?) Apart from the interest payments, are there any other costs to the loan? What do you 
think they are? Do you know what the loan is costing you in total?  
 
5.  Did you realise that you are breaking this contract if you use the money lent to you for 
something different from what is set out in this letter? What else do you think might be 
breaking this contract? (Once they answer, ask: What do you think would happen if you [insert 
their answer]?’) 
 
6.  Did you realise you have the right to make a complaint if the bank [or cooperative] makes a 
mistake? What other rights do you think you might have? 
 
7.  If you had any problems in making payments, who would you discuss this with? 
 
8.  What is the most important thing you have learnt from this paperwork? 
 
9.  What don’t you like about the paperwork?  
 
10.  If you had a choice between this contract (point to summarised version of contract) and the one 
you’ve just signed, which would you prefer? Why? 
 
11. How much of the paperwork did you read?  
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Short form personal loan contract  
 
1.  You are borrowing $ ……… to be advanced on ………. 
 
2.  You are being charged an annual interest rate of ….%, calculated each day, but payable as part 
of your fortnightly repayment of $ ……… 
 
3.  You will pay a loan approval fee of $ ……… 
 
4.  The terms of this loan may be varied by the lender without your consent. 
 
5.  If you fail to make a payment when it falls due, the lender will give you 30 days to pay and will 
then be entitled to demand repayment of the full loan amount. 
 
6.  You will receive a statement from the lender every 6 months and will need to pay between $3 
and $14 for an additional statement should you require it. 
 
 
[Note that loan size, date, interest rate, fortnightly repayment rate and application fee are completed 
by hand at the interview.] 
Coming to grips with credit contracts 
24 
7 References 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2008, 2008 year book Australia, ABS, Canberra. 
Australian Consumers Association 2002, Submission to the Review of the Competition provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, viewed 13 May 2008, 
<http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au/content/subs/105_Summary_ACA.rtf>. 
ANZ 2005, ANZ survey of adult financial literacy in Australia, [ANZ, Melbourne]. 
Carlin, TM 2001, ‘The Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) – 20 years on’, Sydney Law Review, no.23, 
pp.125–44.  
ANZ 2004, A quantitative report on financial exclusion, viewed 15 May 2008, 
<http://www.anz.com/aus/values/commdevFinance/research.asp>. 
Cartwright, P 2004, Banks, consumers and regulation, Hart Publishing, Portland, Oregon. 
Collard, S & Kempson, K 2005, Affordable credit: the way forward, The Policy Press, Bristol. 
Connolly C & Hajaj K 2001, Financial services and social exclusion, Financial Services Consumer Policy 
Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney. 
Consumers’ Federation of Australia 2008 Ultimate unfair contract, viewed 13 May 2008, 
<http://www.consumersfederation.org.au/unfaircontracts.htm>. 
Consumer Affairs Victoria 2005, Consumer Credit Review issues paper, Consumer Affairs Victoria, 
Melbourne, viewed 7 August 2008, 
<http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/CAV_Publications_consultations_Reviews/
$file/cons%20Credit%20Rev%206_05.pdf>. 
Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006, Report of the Consumer Credit Review, Consumer Affairs Victoria, 
Melbourne, viewed 7 August 2008, 
<http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/CAV_Credit_Review_Documents/$file/cre
dit_review_complete.pdf>. 
Consumer Affairs Victoria 2008, The application of unfair contract terms legislation to consumer credit 
contracts: consumer leases and small amount loans, Consultation Paper, viewed 18 August 2008, 
<http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/CAV_Credit_Review_Unfair_Contract_Ter
ms_Consultation_Papers/$file/CAV_Credit_Review_Unfair_Contract_Terms_Consultation_Papers_Small_a
mount_loans_and_consumer_leases.DOC>. 
Cooper, J 2008, Illiterate investors will hurt us all, Australians Securities and Investments Commission, 
viewed 27 April 2008, 
<http://www.fido.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Illiterate_investors_will_hurt_us_all_JCoo
per.pdf/$file/Illiterate_investors_will_hurt_us_all_JCooper.pdf>. 
Coumarelos, C, Wei, Z & Zhou, A 2006, Justice made to measure: NSW Legal Needs Survey in 
disadvantaged areas, Law and Justice Foundation of NSW, Sydney. 
Day, G 1976, ‘Assessing the effects of information disclosure requirements’, Journal of Marketing, vol.40, 
pp. 428–41. 
Gazal-Ayal, O 2007, ‘Economic analysis of standard form contracts: the monopoly case’, European Journal 
of Law and Economics, vol.24, no.2, pp.119–36. 
Genn, H 1999, Paths to justice: what people do and think about going to law, Hart Publishing, Portland, 
Oregon. 
Howells, G 2005, ‘The potential and limits of consumer empowerment by information’, Journal of Law and 
Society, vol.32, no.3, pp.349–70. 
Kofele-Kale, N 1984, ‘The impact of truth-in-lending disclosures on consumer market behaviour: a critique 
of the critics of truth-in-lending law’, Oklahoma City University Law Review, vol.9, pp.117–48. 
KPMG Consulting 2000, NCP Review of the Consumer Credit Code, Ministerial Council on Consumer 
Affairs, Canberra. 
Steps to protect vulnerable borrowers  
25 
Lott, S & Grant, M 2002, Fringe lending and ‘alternative’ banking: the consumer experience, Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Ottawa. 
Malbon, J 1999, Taking credit. a survey of consumer behaviour in the Australian consumer credit market, 
Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, Hobart. 
Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 2005, Pre-contractual disclosure and the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code consultation package, MCCA [Sydney]. 
Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 2008, Joint communiqué, Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 
meeting 15 August 2008, viewed 18 August 2008, 
<http://www.consumer.gov.au/html/download/MCCA_Meetings/Meeting_20_15_Aug_08.pdf>. 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission 2006, Guaranteeing someone else’s debts, Report 107, New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sydney. 
O’Shea, P & Finn, C 2005, ‘Consumer credit code disclosure: does it work?’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance Law and Practice, vol.16, no.1, pp.5–16.  
Patton, MQ 1990, Qualitative evaluation and research methods, 2nd ed., Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 
California. 
Productivity Commission 2007, Review of Australia’s consumer policy framework, draft report, Productivity 
Commission, Canberra. 
Ramsay, I 2000, Access to credit in the alternative consumer credit market, Office of Consumer Affairs, 
Industry Canada and Ministry of the Attorney General, Toronto, Canada. 
Ramsay, I 2004, Consumer credit regulation as ‘the third way’?, keynote address at the Australian Credit at 
the Crossroads Conference, 8–9 November, Melbourne. 
Ramsay I 2007, Consumer law and policy: text and materials on regulating consumer markets, 2nd ed., Hart 
Publishing, Oxford. 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) 2007, Annual report 2006-2007, VCAT, Melbourne. 
Willis, L 2008, Against financial literacy education, University of Pennsylvania Law School Public Research 
Paper No. 08-10, Philadelphia. 
Wilson, D 2000, Payday lending in Victoria: a research report, Consumer Law Centre, .Melbourne. 
